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 11 
The publication of the IPCC special report on 1.5
o
C paved the way for the rise 12 
of the political rhetoric of setting a fixed deadline for decisive actions on 13 
climate change.  However, the dangers of such deadline rhetoric suggest the 14 
need for the IPCC to take responsibility for its report and openly challenge the 15 
credibility of such a deadline. 16 
 17 
In October 2018, the IPCC released its Special Report on 1.5
o
C (SR15), which concluded that 18 
global temperature is likely to reach 1.5
o
C above pre-industrial levels between 2030 and 2052 19 
if the current rate of warming continues [1].  Sensational news headlines interpreting this as a 20 
12 year deadline for the world to avoid catastrophic climate change [2] sparked widespread 21 
calls for urgent radical actions, ranging from the Green New Deal proposal in the USA, the 22 
youth activism of climate school strikes around the world, civil disobedience by the Extinction 23 
Rebellion group to the declaration of a climate emergency by the UK parliament.  The world 24 
suddenly appears to have limited time in which to act decisively on climate change—and, if not, 25 
to be resigned to our climate fate. 26 
 This rise of ‘climate deadline-ism’ is, in some ways, a product of long-standing scientific 27 
(and political) endeavours to quantify what is “dangerous” climate change.  First articulated as 28 
a peak ‘temperature target’, this was then converted to a finite ‘carbon budget’ and is now 29 
expressed as a fixed deadline after which policy interventions are deemed to be ‘too late’.  This 30 
discursive translation of ‘danger’ may help increase a sense of urgency, as evidenced by the 31 
recent emergence of a youth climate movement.  However, it also creates the condition in 32 
which a ‘climate emergency’ is being rashly declared, a move that could lead to politically 33 
dangerous consequences. 34 
Insomuch as the rhetoric of a 2030 deadline arises from political (mis)use of science in 35 
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setting an artificial deadline, this poses a crucial question to scientists, and specifically to the 36 
scientists in the IPCC.  What is a responsible response to the politics of deadline-ism for the 37 
IPCC as the authoritative voice of climate science? 38 
 39 
Quantifying ‘dangerous’ climate change 40 
 41 
Over the last two decades, international climate communities have been discussing how to 42 
operationalise or translate the ultimate objective of the 1992 United Nations Framework 43 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference 44 
with the climate system” [3]—into a concrete, quantitative policy target [4, 5].  While various 45 
target quantities were proposed (such as greenhouse gas concentration, ocean heat content or 46 
sea-level rise), global temperature emerged as the favoured indicator for quantifying a target 47 
level of climate change [6]. 48 
 Since the mid-1990s, 2
o
C of warming above the pre-industrial condition was 49 
increasingly adopted as the temperature threshold to avoid dangerous climate change [5].  The 50 
2015 Paris Agreement introduced 1.5
o
C as an alternative warming target [7]—although it 51 
seemed more a rhetorical aspiration at the time of the Paris talks.  However, since the 52 
publication of the IPCC SR15 in 2018, much public campaigning has de facto reframed what is 53 





 The discovery of the near-linear relationship between a peak global temperature and 55 
cumulative CO2 emissions [8] gave an opportunity for a different quantification of the climate 56 
challenge.  The concept of a ‘carbon budget’ has reframed the mitigation challenge from a flow 57 
problem (i.e., how many emissions in a given year) to a stock problem (i.e., total allowable CO2 58 
emissions over a time period) [9].  Estimating the allowable carbon budget to limit global 59 
warming to a given level has quite rapidly become a central focus of climate modelling 60 
research and shaped the newly dominant policy paradigm [10]. 61 
 62 
Countdown to climate ‘deadline’ 63 
 64 
The scientific effort to find a single number to summarise the mitigation challenge has resulted 65 
in one further move: translation of the carbon budget into an estimate of the time remaining 66 
before exceeding 1.5
o
C becomes ‘likely’.  For example, Leach et al. [11] introduced a new 67 
metric—an ‘adaptation/mitigation timescale’—to capture this thinking, i.e. calculating the 68 
remaining time until a given temperature target is exceeded if the current rate of warming 69 
continues.  Instead of inferring from carbon budgets estimated by model simulations, Leach et 70 
al. [11] used observational data alone, an approach claimed to be more scientifically rigorous 71 
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than relying on models (see also ref. 12).  Their approach provided an important basis for the 72 
IPCC SR15’s estimate of the remaining time to reach 1.5
o
C—a likely range of 12-34 years from 73 
2018 [1].  This is where the ‘12 years’ rhetoric originates. 74 
 The discursive translation of the UNFCCC’s objective of avoiding ‘dangerous climate 75 
change’ can hence be traced: anchored by a temperature target, converted to the quantity of 76 
cumulative CO2 emissions and most recently recalculated into the time remaining to a ‘climate 77 
deadline’, i.e. the ‘due date’ for exhausting the remaining carbon budget at present levels of 78 
CO2 emissions.  This climate deadline has been given public expression through the ‘ticking 79 
clock’ metaphor; clocks that are constantly counting down each second until the allowable 80 
carbon budget is exhausted.  For example, Concordia University in Canada 81 
(https://www.concordia.ca/news/climateclock.html) and the Mercator Research Institute on 82 
Global Commons and Climate Change in Germany (https://www.mcc-83 
berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html) both operate countdown clocks on their websites, 84 




C are exhausted. 85 
 From a communication perspective this translation is understandable.  Neither global 86 
temperature nor carbon budgets convey any great sense of urgency to non-experts [6], 87 
whereas time—and the associated notion of a deadline—is a metric that converts the abstract, 88 
statistical notion of climate change to a more recognisably human experience [13].  Rather 89 
than degrees Celsius rise in temperature or gigatonnes of CO2 emitted, the ticking countdown 90 
clock sends an alarming message to the public of time slipping away. 91 
 92 
Trouble with extending deadline 93 
 94 
However, setting a near-term deadline to urge immediate policy actions could do the opposite 95 
to what is intended.  The speed of the countdown to a climate deadline is set by the rate of 96 
CO2 emissions.  Emissions reductions slow the countdown.  Achieving net-zero CO2 emissions 97 
before exceeding 1.5
o
C would stop the clock.  Net negative emissions through the use of 98 
carbon dioxide removal methods would ‘turn back’ the clock.  While policymakers are urged to 99 
take policy actions to meet the deadline, they might instead be motivated to extend the 100 
deadline.  There are several ways this might be done. 101 
 One way would be to shift some of the benchmarks [14].  For example, time could be 102 
‘added’ to the clock by allowing a temporary overshoot of the temperature threshold.  In 103 
overshoot scenarios, there are two ‘deadlines’ for the carbon budget, differing by how the 104 
budget is defined—either when a specific temperature threshold is first exceeded or else when 105 
the temperature returns to this threshold at a later point in time [15].  If the budget was 106 
defined in the latter way, overshoot could significantly extend the deadline, which would 107 
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provide policymakers with a source of political flexibility to avoid the appearance of policy 108 
failure [16]. 109 
 Alternatively, policymakers might be trapped into more problematic practices of 110 
deadline extension.  The psychology of ‘scarcity’ (or ‘having less’) [17] means that time scarcity 111 
elicits greater focus of mind, leading people to engage more deeply with the issue at hand.  On 112 
the other hand, such a narrowing of people’s attention means that other issues which appear 113 
to be less time-sensitive are neglected.  Importantly, scarcity can also lead people to 114 
‘overborrow’—i.e. insufficient attention is paid to whether the benefits of borrowing outweigh 115 
its cost [17].  That is, when facing a tight deadline people will be likely to ‘borrow time’ by 116 
seeking extensions. 117 
This might then open the door for another way to extend the deadline—using solar 118 
geoengineering, sometimes seen as an emergency stop-gap measure to slow the rate of 119 
warming or shave off overshoot above the temperature threshold [18].  Either way, the 120 
original deadline appears to have been met but in a roundabout way.  Although doing nothing 121 
to reduce CO2 emissions, solar geoengineering can stop warming quickly, in effect ‘borrowing 122 
time’ for emissions reductions through keeping global temperature constant.  The problem is 123 
that the time borrowed through solar geoengineering can only be paid back by large-scale 124 
carbon removal.  If such pay-back doesn’t happen, the original deadline will need to be 125 
extended indefinitely [19].  This is the cost of ‘overborrowing’. 126 
 127 
The political danger of deadline-ism 128 
 129 
Pushing hard to meet a deadline may also cause (unintentionally) dangerous political side 130 
effects.  For example, deadline-ism incubates the political opportunism of declaring a climate 131 
emergency.  It is no surprise that new political movements calling for the declaration of a 132 
‘climate emergency’ in parliaments, cities, schools and universities have arisen in the months 133 
after the release of the IPCC SR15 (see https://www.theclimatemobilization.org/climate-134 
emergency-declarations). 135 
The rhetoric of emergency emerges from the worldview of millenarianism and its 136 
conception of ‘compressed time’ that calls for immediate actions before it is too late [20].  137 
However, regardless of the original intentions, an empty call for emergency ‘actions’ can be 138 
interpreted in myriad ways.  In the worst case, the emergency rhetoric could become ‘stolen 139 
rhetoric’, used as justification for solar geoengineering and potentially for more authoritarian 140 
forms of governance and regulation [20, 21]. 141 
A more fundamental problem with deadline-ism is that it might incite cynical, cry-wolf 142 
responses and undermine the credibility of climate science when an anticipated disaster does 143 
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not happen.  The imagery of deadlines and countdown clocks offers an illusory ‘cliff-edge’ after 144 
which the world heads inevitably to its imminent demise.  It promulgates the imaginary of 145 
extinction and civilisational collapse.  However, the impacts of climate change are more likely 146 
to be intermittent, slow and gradual. 147 
 Of course this does not mean that climate change is not a serious challenge.  The risks 148 
of unfolding climate change need to be taken seriously, but it would be a mistake to take the 149 
claims of a climate deadline literally.  Nevertheless, the scarcity mindset created by countdown 150 
clocks narrows measures of policy success to the single metric of meeting a deadline—climate 151 
policies that merely ‘hit the numbers’ are created and valorised.  Other considerations such as 152 
the justice or sustainability of policies get overlooked. 153 
On top of this, the alarming message conveyed by deadline-ism will only ever resonate 154 
with particular social groups, mostly those that are already predisposed to heightened concern 155 
about climate change.  To others, the message can be alarmist and polarising, alienating them 156 
and restricting the possibility for crafting enduring bipartisan solutions.  Climate change is a 157 
‘wicked social problem’, one that must be resolved and renegotiated, over and over again [22].  158 
Deadline-ism is at once both ineffectual and self-defeating. 159 
 160 
The political responsibility of science 161 
 162 
This rise of climate deadline-ism raises a central question about the role of science in politics.  163 
Despite good intentions, the rhetoric of a 2030 deadline is the political (mis)use of science for 164 
setting arbitrarily an artificial deadline [23].  Whilst the rhetoric is usually seen by scientists as 165 
a misleading interpretation of the IPCC findings [24], so far the IPCC and most climate 166 
scientists have kept silent, thereby implicitly appearing to endorse it.  However, given that the 167 
IPCC’s SR15 report helped create the condition for this rhetoric, as the institutional authority 168 
of climate science the IPCC should take responsibility for more actively engaging in political 169 
conversations around it. 170 
After accepting an invitation from the UNFCCC to prepare a special report on 1.5
o
C, 171 
the IPCC increasingly finds itself in a catch-22 position: operating under a singular regime of 172 
consensual policy neutrality, yet trying to meet the different expectations of governmental 173 
policymakers and a new generation of civic activists [25].  Now the IPCC faces a challenge to its 174 
historical stance of policy neutrality.  To remain silent about the 2030 deadline rhetoric is 175 
perhaps a safe option for the IPCC.  It can retreat into a comfort zone that appears to preserve 176 
its integrity as a policy-neutral advisor. 177 
But because of the dangers of climate deadline-ism which we have outlined, this 178 
would be irresponsible. 179 
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The alternative would be to challenge the political rhetoric of ‘science says we have 180 
only 12 years left’.  This may invite a backlash from activists that the IPCC has become too 181 
political.  However, the IPCC should recognise that the knowledge it produces is already 182 
unavoidably political.  It should therefore act as a politically-responsible agent in the public 183 
sphere and challenge openly the credibility of this deadline rhetoric.   184 
The rise of deadline-ism is but the latest example that climate science has an 185 
inescapably political dimension and that acknowledgement of this by the IPCC is long overdue.  186 
The IPCC can no longer hide its political responsibility behind the ‘neutrality’ of its science. 187 
 188 
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